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Not-For-Profit Hospitals and Managed Care
Organizations: Why the 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt
Status Should Be Revised
By: Andrew C. Papa
Abstract
Healthcare organizations abuse the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status—reaping
tax benefits but failing to give back to their local communities in return. Congress
created the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to benefit the poor and impoverished. Yet,
not-for-profit hospitals and managed care organizations are neither required to
offer services to the poor nor required to offer emergency care services to their
local communities. Instead, they charge higher prices in their increasingly
concentrated markets. Therefore, consumers subsidize the same not-for-profit
healthcare systems that charge them higher prices.
This Article analyzes government-placed incentives under the 501(c)(3) taxexempt status, demonstrating how not-for-profit hospitals unfairly compete with
for-profit hospitals. Studies show that not-for-profit hospitals have larger profit
spreads than their for-profit counterparts. This Article will also demonstrate how
the government encourages not-for-profit healthcare entities to increase their
market power and extract rents from consumers. Today, the out-patient care
business model fractionalizes the healthcare industry. Subsequently, not-for-profit
healthcare entities can now acquire assets or firms in a piecemeal fashion, resulting
in highly concentrated markets.
The third-party payor system and the Affordable Care Act exacerbate the
issue, destroying traditional market forces. The third-party payor system creates a
disconnect between the true provider and true consumer of healthcare treatment.
The Affordable Care Act imposed additional requirements on not-for-profit
hospitals—intending to incentivize charitable giving. Instead, the Affordable Care
Act’s additional requirements incentivize profit-maximizing behavior at the
expense of charitable giving. Because the healthcare industry suffers from a
misalignment of pecuniary incentives and public health needs, creating clout on
who the actual winners and losers are, the tax-exempt status should be revisited.
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Introduction
This Article is part of a broader movement in literature, questioning corporate “bigness” within
our economy.1 Twenty-first century technology enables companies to grow their operations
without suffering diseconomies of scale.2 As a result, markets are shifting for the sake of efficiency
towards oligopolistic and duopolistic market structures.3 Seventy-five percent of American
industries have become more concentrated in recent decades,4 a degree of consolidated economic
power not seen since the Gilded Age.5 In recent years, scholars began writing about corporate
“bigness” and the economic and social ills that stem from it.6 Some scholars challenge well-settled
antitrust law to break up big tech firms such as Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Google.7 Other
scholars suggest the reinvigoration of community values to restore balance to an imbalanced
society.8 However, these scholars focus only on the for-profit sector—ignoring corporate
“bigness” within the not-for-profit sector. Tax-exempt hospitals and managed care

Special thanks to Professor Julia D. Mahoney for her encouragement and helpful comments. Thank you for believing
in me.
1

See TIM WU, T HE C URSE OF B IGNESS : A NTITRUST IN THE N EW G ILDED A GE 14, 20 (2018) (Society is filled
with widespread anger at big businesses and their behavior in concentrated markets. Many people fear their influence
on politics, news, and private information.).
2
Id. at 69–71.
3
Id. at 114–17 (discussing AT&T’s monopoly breakup and its reconsolidation, the oligopolistic airline industry and
cable industry, and concentrated pharmaceutical and entertainment ticket industry); see Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust
Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 585 (2018) (discussing the efficiency gains from mergers).
4
See WU, supra note 1, at 21, 115 (citing the World Economic Form and a study done by Gustavo Grullon); see also
RAGHURAM RAJAN, THE THIRD PILLAR: HOW MARKETS AND THE STATE LEAVE THE COMMUNITY BEHIND 201 (2019)
(stating that business creation in the United States has fallen since the late 1970s).
5
WU, supra note 1, at 14–16.
6
See, e.g., WU, supra note 1; see, e.g., RAJAN, supra note 4; see, e.g., Wright, infra note 7; see, e.g., Khan, infra note 7;
see also Daniel Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1173–75 (2016) (discussing the
relationship between wealth inequality and market competition and the role of antitrust law to redistribute wealth).
7
Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust 2 (George
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-29, 2019) (“The ‘Hipster Antitrust’ label is a lighthearted way to capture a
worldview of antitrust regulation expansive enough to solve societal woes ranging from economic inequality to climate
change.”); see, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 719, 737 (2017) (arguing that the
Chicago’s School of Antitrust thought, prioritizing consumer welfare, is wrong and betrays the legislative history of the
Sherman Act).
8
See RAJAN, supra note 4, at xiii–xviii, 214 (arguing that the economic and political concerns today, including the rise
of populist nationalism and radical movements on the left, can be traced to the diminution of community).
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organizations are also growing in market concentrations, causing healthcare prices to rise. This
Article argues for not-for-profit tax reform, combating the economic and social ills that stem from
the not-for-profit corporate form.
The 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status is a special treatment under the Internal Revenue Code
afforded to “charitable” organizations; it is not its own corporate form of organization.9 The
Internal Revenue Code defines “charitable” broadly. The definition includes a variety of
acceptable purposes, such as the relief of the poor and the advancement of religion, education, or
science. The tax-exempt status allows organizations to operate tax-free if they meet the necessary
requirements. Applicants seeking this status need not be corporate entities.10 Not-for-profit
corporations and unincorporated organizations such as trusts, foundations, and associations
governed by a set of bylaws may apply.11 After qualifying, “charitable” organizations reap tax
exemptions from income, real property, sales, and other specialized taxes—relieving substantial
tax burdens.12
This Article is the first to map the behavioral incentives of tax-exempt hospitals, postAffordable Care Act, and explains why their charitable giving has waned over the years.13 In 2019,

9

See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85
YALE L.J. 299, 302, 330 (1976); see generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 54 (1981).
10
FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 2.05, 1 (Supp. 2012-2).
11
Id.
12
JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (5th ed. 2015).
13
See Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1447–87 (1980)
(discussing the fundamental problems of not-for-profit hospitals in healthcare and potential solutions); see also Douglas
M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1015, 1016–20
(1988); see also John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals and Other
Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1992); see also Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the
Nonprofit Hospital: Is the Tax-Exempt Status still Warranted?, 26 URB. LAW. 143, 143–45 (1994); see generally Mary
Crossley, Health and Taxes: Hospitals, Community Health and the IRS, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 51
(2016) (evaluating community health need assessments under the Affordable Care Act); see generally Michael W. Jin,
Section 501(r): A Better Charitable Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals, 69 TAX LAWYER 749 (2016) (evaluating the
effectiveness of the Affordable Care Act’s 501(r) requirements); see generally Erica A. Clausen & Abbey L. Hendricks,
Cultivating the Benefit of § 501(r)(3): § 501(r)(3) Requirements for Nonprofit Hospitals, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1025 (2016) (evaluating the effectiveness of the requirement); see generally Shirley S. Pan, Closing the Gaps and
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the United States Senate Committee on Finance probed tax-exempt hospitals for their charitable
giving—sending a letter to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asking why charitable giving has
decreased over the years while tax expenditures have risen.14 Perplexed with the statistic, the
Senate Committee on Finance requested a report on tax-exempt hospitals’ compliance with the
Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements for tax-exempt hospitals.15

This Article

demonstrates that not-for-profit hospital’s waning charitable giving stems from a more-vexing
issue, the IRS’s interpretation of “charitable” for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals and not the
enforcement of the Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements.
This Article demonstrates that the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for hospitals is no longer
justified and should be revised. Congress intended the tax-exempt status to benefit the poor and
impoverished—improving the general welfare of the economy in exchange for tax breaks. Yet,
tax-exempt hospitals behave just like their for-profit counterparts, breaking their societal contract
with the government.16 Tax-exempt hospitals do not need to offer services to the poor, nor do they
need to offer emergency care facilities to maintain their tax-exempt status.17 Studies show that notfor-profit hospitals, like for-profit ones, raise their prices in concentrated markets and do not
provide more uncompensated care.18 In addition, further studies show that not-for-profit hospitals

Loopholes: Analyzing Tax Exemption of Non-Profit Hospitals Joint Ventures After the Affordable Care Act, 39 AM. J.L.
& MED. 671 (2013) (discussing the problems with implementing the Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements).
14
See Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Charles P. Rettig, Comm’r, Internal Revenue
Serv. (Feb. 19, 2019) (citing Dan Diamond, How Hospitals Got Richer Off Obamacare, POLITICO (July 17, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obamacare-non-profit-hospital-taxes/ (stating the Affordable Care Act has
provided hospitals with 20 million more customers while sometimes neglecting the needy neighborhoods around
them)).
15
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012); see generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 1322, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
16
THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 43–55 (4th ed.
2013).
17
See infra note 44–47 and accompanying text.
18
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 52 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2009); see, e.g.,
Ge Bai & Gerard F. Anderson, US Hospitals are still Using Chargemaster Markups to Maximize Revenues, 35 HEALTH
AFF. 1658, 1663 (2016) (showing that hospitals mark up the prices for medical consumables 2–28 times greater than
the costs to purchase them).
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pay their employees, on average, more than for-profit hospitals for comparable work.19
First, Part I discusses the concerns among different interest groups and why the tax-exempt
status should have stricter requirements or be abolished altogether. Second, Part II discusses notfor-profit hospitals, their ability to obtain the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, and the pros and cons
of the tax-exempt corporate form. Part II further explains how managed care organizations obtain
tax-exempt status under 501(c)(4) and how healthcare has evolved over the past century. Lastly,
Part III explains why hospitals switched to the out-patient care model and why the third-party
payor system is inefficient. Part III also discusses the competitive advantages of the tax-exempt
corporate form and how hospitals interact with managed care organizations.

I.

Tax–Exemption Concerns
A. Government’s Perspective
Tax-exempt entities have deep-rooted traditions in American societal structure.20 No precise

explanation for this tradition exists. Nevertheless, it is clear that the tax exemption was a product
of citizens’ collective action to combat problems in society in a nongovernmental form.21 Courts
and congressional committees continue to uphold these long-held tax-exemptions and have even
created new types of qualifying organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c). The House Committee on
Ways and Means stated the following to accompany the Revenue Act of 1938:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that
government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from

19

See KAREN P. SHAHPOORI & JAMES SMITH, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS., WAGES IN PROFIT AND NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS AND UNIVERSITIES 4 (June 29, 2005), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/wages-in-profit-and-nonprofithospitals-and-universities.pdf; see also Christian King & Gregory Lewis, Nonprofit Pay in a Competitive Market:
Wage Penalty of Premium?, 46 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1073, 1073 (2017).
20
See Michael Fricke, The Case Against Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1129, 1138–39
(2015) (“[F]rom the very beginning of broad taxation in the United States, charitable organizations have been
exempt.”); see also HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 9, 10, 11.
21
HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 11–12.
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the promotion of the general welfare.22
Subsequently, in a 1973 Committee, the then-secretary of the Treasury observed:
[Tax-exempt] organizations are an important influence for diversity
and a bulwark against over-reliance on big-government. The tax
privileges extended to these institutions were purged of abuse in
1969 and we believe the existing deductions for charitable gifts and
bequest are an appropriate way to encourage those institutions. We
believe the public accepts them as fair.23
This legislative history suggests the government views tax-exempt entities as the very
fabric of American life and is unlikely to consider the total subrogation of tax-exempt entities.24
The justifications supporting the tax-exempt status for not-for-profit hospitals in the early 1900s
are no longer present.25 In the early twentieth century, the United States’ healthcare infrastructure
was lacking, and healthcare access was not institutionalized.26 Today, the infrastructure for
healthcare is well developed, and citizens can obtain lifesaving treatment within hours. Because
the United States’ healthcare infrastructure is so well developed and tax-exempt hospitals are not
required to give free treatment, the tax-exempt status for healthcare entities does not confer direct
benefits to our society. Instead, it only confers indirect benefits—such as developing new,
innovative medical procedures or teaching the next generation of healthcare professionals.27
Accordingly, the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status should be partially abrogated within the healthcare
industry.

22

Id. at 11 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)).
Public Hearing on General Tax Reform: Testimony from Administration and Public Witnesses Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93rd Cong. 6890 (1973) (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary, Treasury Department); see also
Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act 1971: Lessions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14 B.C. L. REV. 813, 852
(1973).
24
HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 11–13.
25
Id. at 43–55.
26
See generally Youssra Marjou & Kevin J. Bozic, Brief History of Quality of Movement in US Healthcare, 5 CURRENT
REVS. MUSCULOSKELETAL MED. 265, 265–66 (2012).
27
See Annetine C. Gelijns et al., Capturing the Unexpected Benefits of Medical Research, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 693–
94 (1998); see also Colleen J. Goode et al., Nurse Residency Programs: An Essential Requirement for Nursing, 27
NURSING ECON. 142, 143 (2009) (stating that it takes at least one year for a person to master a job within healthcare);
see, e.g., Pamela Lyss-Lerman et al., What Training is Needed in the Fourth Year of Medical School? Views of
Residency Program Directors, 84 ACAD. MED. 823, 827 (2009) (finding that workplace learning is important and distinct
from school learning).
23
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The government’s tax expenditures on not-for-profit hospitals outweigh the indirect benefits
they generate—thus, the quid pro quo is no longer fair. In 2014, 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
organizations raised $1.94 trillion in untaxed revenue, equating to 11% of the United States’ 2014
Gross Domestic Product, approximately half of which is attributable to hospitals and primary care
facilities.28 Further analysis of the empirical evidence indicates 501(c)(3) organizations’ profits,
which is defined as revenue minus liabilities, increased from $95.5 billion in 2010 to $148.2 billion
in 2014.29
Despite growing tax expenditures, innovative medical procedures only increased the United
States’ life expectancy by one percent from 2006 to 2016, from an average age of 77.8 years to
78.6 years respectively.30 Further, tax-exempt status is not a necessary requirement to engage in
teaching medical professionals—any hospital may engage in teaching the next generations of
medical professionals. Therefore, the government is allocating huge tax expenditures on taxexempt healthcare organizations with little economic or social return.31 Accordingly, the
government should tighten the belt on 501(C)(3) tax-exempt hospitals, ensuring tax-payer money
is used to benefit the citizens who pay it.

B. Consumers’ Perspective
Consumers subsidize an inefficient third-party payor system and receive higher insurance

28

See SOI Tax Stats – Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other- tax-exempt-organizations-statistics (last reviewed Aug.
31, 2020); see also Gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1990 to 2020, STATISTICA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/188105/annual-gdp-of-the-united-states-since-1990/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020); see
also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND
CHARITABLE SECTOR 10 (2009) (showing hospitals held 38 percent of the total assets and earned 57 percent of the total
revenues in the charitable sector).
29
See INTERNAL REV. SERVS., supra note 28.
30
Rabah Kamal, How does U.S. life expectancy compare to other countries?, PETERSON-KFF (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-life-expectancy-compare-countries/#item-start; see also
ELIZABETH ARIAS & JIQUAN XU, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES, 2017, at 10 (2019).
31

See generally U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, TAX EXPENDITURES 2018, at 14 (2016) (showing that the exclusion of employer
contributions for medical insurance is the largest tax expenditure at $235.8 billion, twice as large as the second-largest
tax expenditure at $112.7 billion).
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premiums in return. The healthcare insurance market lacks competition.32 Consumers take
whatever insurance they can get their hands on.33 Employees demand employer-sponsored
insurance programs because of their inherent tax benefits—making employer-sponsored insurance
programs an essential commodity for employers to maintain skilled workforces.34 Employers, as
an agent of their employees, can negotiate healthcare insurance contracts and reallocate funds from
their employees’ wages to purchase them. 35 These comprehensive plans typically provide the most
coverage and result in employee over insurance.36 By accommodating their employees’ demand
for employer-sponsored health insurance and incorporating their employees’ wages into the plan’s
purchase price, employers buy plans with the most coverage and force employees to take indirect
pay-cuts and overconsume healthcare coverage.
Consumers could be contributing to the increasing cost of healthcare insurance, consuming as
much healthcare as possible.37 But this issue could be avoided altogether by getting rid of the thirdparty payor system. If consumers were required to pay for extra procedures out of pocket, instead
of through a third-party intermediary, they would internalize the “true cost” of their consumption.
When consumers internalize the “true cost” of their healthcare services, they will only consume
procedures that truly matter to them. Because healthcare insurers act as intermediaries between
healthcare consumers and healthcare providers, contracting with employers or consumers directly

32

See Thomas Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217,
236 (2009) (“[B]asic necessities for effective shopping are missing: prices for health services are not readily available, or
knowable, ex ante. Likewise, those left to buy health insurance in the individual market have encountered significant
problems in comparing offerings and understanding risks associated with co-payment obligations and limitations on
coverage.”).
33
Id.
34
See Michael Doonan & Gabrielle Katz, Choice in the American Healthcare System: Changing Dynamics under the
Affordable Care Act, 63 CURRENT SOC. MONOGRAPH 746, 750 (2015); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman,
Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 37, 38 (2006).
35
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 34.
36
Id.
37
See Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP.
47, 52–53 (2011); see also Ching-To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and
Managed Care, 82 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 81, 102 (2004).
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on the front-end—for insurance coverage—and healthcare providers on the back-end—for
treatment—consumers cannot internalize the “true cost” of their healthcare services.38
Consumers of healthcare only observe changes in co-payments and not the “true cost” of their
healthcare services.39 Healthcare insurers know their customers have co-payment price
expectations. Therefore, healthcare insurers will extract as much economic surplus as possible
from healthcare providers during negotiations, without increasing their customers’ co-payments.
Even if they change the price of their customers’ co-payments, the changes will be insubstantial
relative to their prior co-payment. In effect, the degree of economic surplus healthcare insurers and
healthcare providers retain after negotiations is a function of their relative market power. The entity
with greater relative market power will extract more surplus in the transaction. Because healthcare
insurers can negotiate the prices of healthcare services down, increasing their bottom lines, and
are not required to pass those gains on to consumers, consumers are unable to capture market
surplus within the transaction.

C. Solutions: Moving Forward with the Tax–Exempt Status
The government should revise the requirements for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals and
501(c)(4) tax-exempt Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in the third-party payor system.
Tax-exempt healthcare entities retain too much discretion in their capital allocation, granting them
unfair advantages over their for-profit counterparts without proportional societal benefit in return.
Two potential solutions to this problem exist, neither of which is mutually exclusive. Either the
government tightens the belt on tax-exempt healthcare organizations, or congress reforms the

38

Havighurst & Richman, supra note 34.
See Ateev Mehrota et al., Consumers’ and Providers’ Responses to Public Cost Reports, and How to Raise the
Likelihood of Achieving Desired Results, 31 HEALTH AFF. 843, 845 (2012); cf. Stephen L. Issacs, Consumers’
Information Needs: Results of a National Survey, 15 HEALTH AFF. 31, 31 (1996); cf. E.B. Keeler et al., Deductibles
and the Demand for Medical Services: Theory of a Consumer Facing a Variable Price Schedule under Uncertainty, 45
ECONOMETRICA 641, 641, 654 (1977).
39
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third-party payor system to a more efficient model.
First, the government should make it harder for hospitals and HMOs to qualify as “charitable”
and maintain a tax-exempt status because they behave just like for-profit entities and do not
necessarily confer “charitable” benefits to their local communities.40 Even though tax-exempt
hospitals engage in medical research, teaching, or technological innovation,41 the amount of
untaxed revenue the government forgoes is greater than the indirect benefits tax-exempt hospitals
generate for society. As a result, tax-exempt hospitals should be prohibited from owning for-profit
subsidiaries and should be required to dedicate a portion of their revenue back to their local
communities. Along the same lines, hospitals that only specialize in certain types of medical
procedures should not be considered “charitable” organizations under the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status.
Second, the third-party payor system should be reformed to make healthcare markets driven
by price competition instead of non-price, competitive factors.42 Price is the very essence of
competition, and without it, markets cannot function. Consumers should internalize the price of
the healthcare treatment and the healthcare insurance they receive, which in turn, would reduce
overconsumption and increase consumer surplus. Alternatively, the government could reform the
third-party payor system to a single-payer system where the government insures all of its citizens.
Under a single-payer system, the government would reap huge savings on administrative costs by

40

See Lisa K. Helvin, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals Doing Their Share, 8 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421, 452–57 (2008) (stating that Texas was the first state to pass legislation requiring hospitals to
allocate a specific percentage of revenues for charity care and community benefit and that a few other states followed
suit); see generally Cory Capps et al., Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care?,
[page cited] (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23131, 2017).
41
See Gelijns et al., supra note 27; see also Goode et al., supra note 27 (finding that it takes at least one year for a
person to master a job within healthcare because the healthcare culture emphasizes specialization, technology, and
perfectionist standards); see, e.g., Lyss-Lerman et al., supra note 27 (finding that workplace learning is important and
distinct from school learning).
42
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 244 (1940) (defining price competition as the main economic
driver in a free market).
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eliminating third parties. The government could then reallocate administrative cost savings
towards specific public health concerns, such as child obesity.
The first solution is the least contentious of proposed solutions and would be well received by
both adherents of redistribution of wealth and free market principles. Adherents of wealth
redistribution principles would want to tighten the belt on tax-exempt organizations to ensure taxexempt subsidies are indeed aiding local communities via charitable giving. On the other hand,
adherents of free market principles would view the tax-exempt subsidies as unfair, reducing
competition among healthcare entities and raising prices for consumers. The difference in opinion
would only pose issues if the tax exemption were abolished altogether. If it were, adherents of
wealth redistribution principles would want the new stream of income reallocated to government
programs that aid the poor and impoverished. Conversely, adherents of free market principles would
likely want the new stream of income appropriated to the government itself, reducing budget
deficits or paying down outstanding government debt.
Healthcare reform is the most challenging solution to reconcile. Each philosophical group
would get entrenched in their diametrically opposed positions. Adherents of wealth redistribution
principles would rally behind a single-payer system, similar to ones adopted in Europe. However,
adherents of free market principles would dig their heels in, detesting “big government”
subsidizing healthcare for hundreds of millions of Americans. In addition, they would also propose
the repeal of government programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act. This
fundamental disparity in opinion is why the United States uses a mixed system, combining a singlepayer system with a third-party payor system. Due to this reality, perhaps we should work to
revitalize community values, reconciling divergent political factions. Only through unity can we
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effectuate change.43 If the revitalization of community values is the answer, then a tax-exempt
distribution requirement may be the key to unified healthcare reform.

II.

Not-for-Profit Hospitals & The 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status,
Managed Care Organizations, and The Government

A. Not-For-Profit Hospitals & The 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status
Hospitals can organize their corporate charter as a “charitable” 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
organization without changing their substantive operations. The IRS and most state courts do not
require 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals to provide free healthcare or services priced below the cost
of production to maintain their status.44 This rule was first promulgated in 1969 when the IRS
defined “charitable” for 501(c)(3) hospitals in Rev. Rul. 69-545.45 Later, in 1983, the IRS
amplified their definition of “charitable” for 501(c)(3) tax-exempted hospitals in Rev. Rul. 83-157
(“Second Rev. Ruling”). According to the Second Rev. Ruling, not-for-profit hospitals need not
furnish emergency room care where a state health planning agency has determined that the
emergency room care would be duplicative of emergency healthcare services available at another
medical facility in the community. The Second Rev. Ruling further stated the following:
[T]he promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the
advancement of education and religion, is one of the purposes in the
general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the community as
a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a
direct benefit from its activities does not include all members of the
43

See RAJAN, supra note 4, at 320, 338, 346 (describing how to reinvigorate community values and some common
themes that arise in doing so).
44
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (stating that tax-exempt hospitals can deny patients who are unwilling to pay
unless they are in need of emergency treatment), amplified by Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1982-2 C.B. 94; ARTHUR F.
SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 111 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that many states
adopted the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act or a variation of it); see Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 425 U.S.
26, 27 (1926) (upholding Rev. Rul. 69-545); see also 1 MARILYN PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS,
TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 1:11 [confirm source] (Supp. 2009) (a leading treatise summarizing the differences in
states’ non-profit corporate law); see also Hugh K. Webster, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Organizational Requirements,
451 T.M. at A-26 (2018).
45
See FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 303 (citing Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health
Policy: Hospitals, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 251 (1991) (stating that
Rev. Rul. 69-545 was not based on any thoughtful public policy debate but rather was the result of a successful
lobbying effort by nonprofit hospitals, arguing that the arrival of Medicare, Medicaid, and private industry growth
would render charitable care useless)).
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community. The class must be sufficiently large, however, so that
the community as a whole benefits.46
Combining both rulings, the IRS’s definition of “charitable” indicates that poverty relief is not
a necessary requirement for hospitals to obtain and maintain tax-exempt status.47 Therefore, notfor-profit hospitals, similar to for-profit hospitals, can still earn profits, charge prices higher than
their total production costs, and reinvest those same profits into physical facilities or endowments
without helping their local communities.48
Even though strict operating requirements reduce the means by which a tax-exempt
organization can raise capital, studies indicate that the inherent benefits of the tax-exempt status
outweigh the negative aspects of strict operating requirements.49 Coupling this proposition with
empirical evidence that 501(c)(3) organizations are growing in concentration, scale, and profits
indicates that the tax-exempt status is being sought out as a better tax structure. Data collected by
the IRS and studies conducted by healthcare professionals demonstrate that the 501(c)(3) taxexempt status is superior. First, the assets of 501(c)(3) organizations almost doubled from 2004–
2014, from $2 trillion to $3.7 trillion, even though the number of not-for-profit organizations has
been fluctuating sporadically over the years.50 Second, the margins that 501(c)(3) organizations
realize increased year-over-year from 2010–2014, from $95.5 billion to $148.2 billion, a $52.7

46

Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1982-2 C.B. 94.
SOUTHWICK, supra note 44, at 62, 63.
48
Id.
49
See Bradley Herring et al., Comparing the Value of Nonprofit Hospitals’ Tax Exemption to Their Community
Benefits, 55 J. HEALTH CARE ORG. 1, 1, 9 (2018) (“For policy makers who desire to motivate hospitals to provide
adequate community benefits and, in particular charity care to underserved populations, the tax exemption currently
appears to be rather a blunt instrument, as many nonprofits benefit greatly from the tax exemption yet provide relatively
few community benefits.”).
50
See Tax Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (reviewing
the IRS collected data from Form 990 filings to compare not-for-profit organizations’ aggregated assets from 2004–
2014). Generally, the 501(c)(3) tax-exemption requires organizations to file annual returns on Form 990, disclosing
their revenue, expenses, and assets. I.R.C. § 6033 (a)(1) (2012); Hugh K. Webster, Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Reporting, Disclosure and Other Procedural Aspects, 452-1st T.M. at A-4 (2017) (Because Form 990 increases the
transparency of 501(c)(3) organizations, we can use Form 990 filings to analyze not-for-profit hospitals’ behavior.).
47
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billion nominal increase in yearly profits or a 57 percent change.51
Hospitals receive four primary advantages from the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status but only one
primary disadvantage.52 First, the organization will gain exemptions from all federal income taxes
other than the unrelated trade or business income tax (“UBIT”).53 The UBIT imposes taxes on a
tax-exempt organization’s regularly conducted trade or businesses “unrelated” to their “charitable”
purpose. Despite this tax, the IRS defines “related” activities broadly, giving hospitals ample room
to operate tax-free.54 Second, the organization can gain tax exemptions from various state and
local taxes that differ among the states. Third, the organization can receive tax-deductible
contributions from donors, subject to certain limitations.55 Fourth, a for-profit corporation applying
for the tax-exempt status can choose to incur windfall gains via retroactive tax benefits, applying
the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status retroactively up to 27 months.56 The primary disadvantage of the
tax-exempt tax status is the prohibition against private inurement.57 The prohibition of private
inurement restricts not-for-profit organizations’ ability to raise capital through equity.58 Therefore,
not-for-profit entities can only raise capital by taking out debt, selling goods or services, or

51

See Tax Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (reviewing
the IRS collected data from their Form 990 filings to compare the profits of not-for-profit hospitals since the enactment
of the Affordable Care Act in 2010). “Margins” means the spread between the organization’s operating cost and their
total revenues and is synonymous with “profits.”
52
See Webster, supra note 44, at A-3–A-4.
53
I.R.C. § 501(a)–(b) (2012); see also I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(A) (2012) (stating the 501(c)(3) organizations are subject to
the UBIT).
54
Rev. Rul. 69-463, 1969-2 C.B. 131 (holding that leasing hospital space by a hospital to a hospital based medical
group is related); Rev. Rul. 69-269, 1969-1 C.B. 160 (holding that hospital parking lots are related activities); Rev. Rul.
69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160 (holding that hospital cafeterias and coffeeshops were related activities); Hi-Plains Hosp. v.
United States, 670 F.2d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that a hospital’s pharmacy sales to nonpatients could be
treated as related income, if the sales were infrequent and the hospital was the sole hospital in a small community); see
SOUTHWICK, supra note 44, at 169; see, e.g., United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 1591 (1986) (stating
that income received by a medical organization from commercial advertisements in professional journal is taxable
unrelated business income).
55
I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012).
56
Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(2)(i) T.D. 9819, 82 Fed. Reg. 29, 730 (June 30, 2017), applicable July 1, 2014 (allowing for
15 months); Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-2 (1997) (allowing for additional automatic 12-month extension); see Rev. Proc.
2018-5, I.R.B. 01; see also Webster, supra note 44, at A- 4.
57
See Webster, supra note 44, at A-4.
58
Id.
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soliciting tax-deductible contributions.
Hospitals face three main incentives to utilize the corporate form because the law generally
treats corporations as separate and distinct from those who created them, own them, or are
employed by them.59 The first reason is limited liability. Under the concept of limited liability,
owners of a corporation are not personally liable for the contracts or the torts of the corporation
beyond the extent of their investment.60 The second incentive is continuity of existence.61 Unlike a
partnership, a corporation is unaffected by the death of owners or board members.62 Lastly, if the
corporation is for-profit, it can freely transfer its ownership interest and raise capital through equity
with the issuance of stock.63
Hospitals can use the not-for-profit corporate form for its inherent tax benefits; however, in
doing so, they give up the right to raise capital through equity. Many states do not have laws for
not-for-profit corporations, and some adopted the Model Non-profit Corporation Act or a variation
of it to govern them.64 Even though the laws governing not-for-profit corporations vary from state
to state, a general rule has emerged. The standard requirement among states is that no part of the
income or profit can be distributed for private gain to its members.65 Therefore, the standard
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Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.)
(“[Corporations are] an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of the law, it possesses only those properties which the charter confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental
to its very existence.”).
60
See MODEL BUS. CORPS. ACT ANNOTATED § 6.22(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (Unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation, except
that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (1991) (stating that limited liability is the distinguishing
feature of corporate law, shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation); see, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc.
v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1311 (1993) (upholding limited liability as a general default rule as long as
corporate formalities are respected and the corporation is not acting as the shareholder’s alter ego).
61
MODEL BUS. CORPS. ACT ANNOTATED § 2.02 cmt. (3)(c) (4th ed. 2008).
62
See SOUTHWICK, supra note 44, at 107.
63
Id. at 108.
64
Id. at 111; see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANNOTATED, at xix (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“Twenty-four states have
adopted all or substantially all of the model act as their general corporation statute, and seven other jurisdictions have
statutes based on the 1969 version of the Act.”); see, e.g., Nonprofit Corporation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.2101–
450.3099 (1986).
65
SOUTHWICK, supra note 44.
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requirement prohibits not-for-profit corporations from raising funds through the issuance of stock.
Despite not-for-profit corporations’ inability to raise funds through equity, they can raise capital
in three other ways. First, they can charge customers prices for their goods or services.66 Second,
they can raise capital through charitable donations. Potential donors face incentives to donate to
not-for-profit organizations because they can receive tax deductions for their donations to a certain
extent.67 Thirdly, they can take out loans to fund their operations.68 Because not-for-profit
corporations retain viable methods for raising capital, they can still compete against
for-profit corporations that raise capital through equity.
Not-for-profit hospitals can operate for-profit subsidiaries, separating for-profit business
activities from their parent company to ensure that their tax exemption is safe. The extent to which
a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization can engage in for-profit activities without threatening its taxexempt status is vague. The IRS has no clear rule. The IRS determines whether a tax-exempt entity
engages in too much for-profit activity on an unpredictable case-by-case basis. 69 Thus, not-forprofit entities engage in high-stakes gambling, with their tax-exempt status on the line, when they
engage in for-profit activities.70 Because not-for-profit entities can separate their not-for-profit
activities from their for-profit activities through subsidiaries and could lose their tax-exempt status
for comingling for-profit and not-for-profit activities, for-profit hospitals face incentives to convert
to the tax-exempt corporate form. In effect, for-hospitals could separate their for-profit operations
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Christopher Cheney, Differences Between NFPs And For-Profits Are Marginal, HEALTH LEADERS (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/finance/differences-between-nfps-and-profits-are-marginal# (The line between forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals has blurred. Both share the same mission of delivering high-quality care, and both
must make sustainable bottom lines in order to achieve their mission.).
67
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR USE IN PREPARING 2017 RETURNS 2, 13 (Mar. 12,
2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p526--2017.pdf (indicating that the Internal Revenue Code has limitations,
known as phaseouts, on the amount a person or corporation can claim as charitable donations).
68
See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. REG. 139, 160–61 (2007) (A not-for-profit
organization can secure its debt against any assets that they own, which can range from real property in the form of real
estate to personal property in the form of stocks or bonds.).
69
Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 478 (2012).
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Id.
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into subsidiary organizations—reaping tax breaks without changing their operations in substantial
ways.
Not-for-profit hospitals can also obtain tax-exempt statuses for their subsidiaries if their
subsidiaries are an “integral part” of the parent company. The Integral Part Doctrine uses a twoprong approach to determine whether a subsidiary may qualify for tax-exempt status under
501(c)(3).71 First, the subsidiary may not carry on a trade or business unrelated to tax-exempt
activities if the parent carried it on. Second, the subsidiary’s relationship to its parent may not
enhance its own exempt character to the point that the subsidiary would be entitled to its own
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status when adding the business provided by the parent to the contributions
made by the subsidiary itself.
Converting a for-profit hospital to a not-for-profit hospital is quite simple. Generally, a forprofit institution must file a Form 1023 to apply for the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, which requires
an $850 fee—further reduced for organizations with low expected revenues.72 Before filing, Form
1023 requires a for-profit entity to do four things: (1) preselect its board of directors; (2) prepare a
conflict of interest policy; (3) prepare articles of incorporation; and (4) prepare the bylaws it wishes
to implement.73 For-profit entities can repurpose their board of directors and conflict of interest
policies for the new, tax-exempt organization. Similarly, its articles of incorporation and bylaws
would only need minor alterations to further a “charitable” purpose listed in 501(c)(3). Because a
for-profit hospital can repurpose their board members, corporate policies, and corporate
governance documents and do not need to change their day-to-day operations, for-profit hospitals
71

Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b)(1)-(2) (1980); Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 30 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1994)
(applying the integral part doctrine to an HMO subsidiary owned by a larger, not-for-profit health system); see, e.g.,
Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding that a for-profit restaurant and bookstore
that used college space, served faculty and students, and devoted its earning to educational purposes were integral
parts of a not-for-profit college).
72
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf.; Webster, supra note 50, at A-3–A-4.
73
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 72.
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face little barriers to entry when converting to a not-for-profit entity.
In practice, a for-profit hospital seeking tax-exempt status would have to rid itself of its
shareholders to reincorporate. A for-profit hospital could use a leveraged buyout—using its highvalue assets as collateral to obtain loans—to repurchase its stock at a reasonable premium above
fair market value.74 In addition, entities reorganizing as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt corporation must
pass an organizational test and an operational test to qualify and maintain their status.75 The
organizational test relates to the organization’s purpose as described by the organizational charter,
whereas the operational test relates to the actual activities conducted by the organization.76For-profit
hospitals convert to not-for-profit status to build trust with the local community and manage public
relations.77 On the other hand, not-for-profit hospitals convert to for-profit corporations because of
financial concerns and board perceptions on mission achievement.78 Although the line between
organizational statuses seems fluid, hospitals converting from a not-for-profit hospital to a for-profit
hospital face more barriers. An organization seeking this conversion typically needs permission
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See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 858–97 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695
(Del. 2009) (imposing fiduciary duties upon board members to have their corporate shares valued by a third-party
before purchasing them in a leveraged buyout.).
75
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (1980) (stating that organizations that fail either test will not be considered exempt
from taxation as a public charity).
76
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv) (1980); Colorado State Chiropractic Soc’y v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 487, 493 (1989)
(holding that an organization’s primary purpose could be determined from a review of its bylaws as well as its articles
of incorporation); see also Webster, supra note 50, at A-10.
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See Kamal R. Desai et al., Hospital Conversions from For-Profit to Nonprofit Status: The Other Side of the Story, 55
MED. CARE RES. & REV. 298, 309–13 (1998) (finding a lack of controversy surrounding for-profit conversions: policy
makers and community leaders presumably welcome for-profit conversions because they believe that nonprofit
ownership will lead to greater benefits in the community. However, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that forprofit conversions actually result in more uncompensated care to the communities and that the “net payoff” of
conversions are still uncertain.).
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See David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, Converting Hospitals from Not-For-Profit to For-Profit Status: Why and
What Effects? 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6672, 1998); see also SARA R. COLLINS ET
AL., THE FOR-PROFIT CONVERSION OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: EIGHT CASE STUDIES
1, 1–3 (2001) (finding that not-for-profit hospitals’ financial distresses were caused by a variety of factors, including
inability to adapt to prospective reimbursement changes in the Medicare Program and technological advancement in
patient care. However, the study could not determine the exact reasons why the hospitals were sold to for-profit
organizations.).
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from their state attorney general, typically an elected official who wants to win public support.79
Current studies suggest that the public, on the whole, has preconceived beliefs about “not-forprofit” entities—believing they do good things for society and should be trusted, even when, in fact,
they do little good.80 Because state attorneys general want to win public support, and the public has
preconceived notions that not-for-profits are good for society and should be trusted, state attorneys
general will probably deny any conversion requests to maintain public support.
Empirical evidence indicates not-for-profit hospitals only provide marginally more
uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals despite little difference in their economic behavior.81
This study used eleven years of detailed data on hospital competition and several measures of
charity care. Specifically, it found no differences in the propensities of for-profit and not-for-profit
hospitals to provide more charity care as their market power and margins increased. Since taxexempt hospitals are not required to give free care under the IRS’s interpretation of “charitable,”
79

FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 169–77 (citing e.g., Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270–71 (1988)
(The New York Attorney General has the responsibility to oversee not-for-profit entities with his parens patriae
authority.)); see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 152, 319 (2004) (stating
that most states have non-distribution constraints on liquid or nonliquid assets to individuals which could in itself
prevent the conversion of a not-for-profit entity).
80
See Jennifer Aaker et al., Nonprofits are Seen as Warm and For-Profits as Competent: Firm Stereotypes Matter, 37
J. CONSUMER RES. 224, 237 (2010) (concluding that people judge companies along similar dimensions as they do
other people, and that nonprofits are generally considered to be high in “warmth”); see cf. Nick Lin-Hi et al., Does
CSR Matter for Nonprofit Organizations? Testing the Link Between CSR Performance and Trustworthiness in the
Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Domain 26 INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 1944, 1949, 1962 (2014)
(concluding that higher level of perceived trustworthiness can lead to a competitive advantage over for-profit firms).
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Cory Capps et al., Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23131, 2017) (finding similar levels of uncompensated care among for-profit and notfor-profit hospitals and questioning whether tax exemptions for not-for-profit hospitals are an efficient method for
funding care for the poor); cf. Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., Community Benefit Activities of Private, Nonprofit Hospitals, 35
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1000, 1022 (2010) (finding that nonreligious, not-for-profit hospitals in California and
Florida gave around the same amount of uncompensated care, including Medicaid spending, as for-profit hospitals); cf.
Paul Gertler, Does it Matter who your Buyer is? The Role of Nonprofit Mission in the Market for Corporate Control of
Hospitals, 53 J.L. & ECON. 295, 305 (2009) (finding that not-for-profit hospitals behave like for-profits when dealing
with for-profits in a market for corporate control). But see William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the
Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437, 439, 453 (1995) (citing Thomas J. Hoerger, “Profit” Variability in
For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 10 J. HEALTH & ECON. 259, 273 (1991) for the proposition that not-for-profit
hospitals react in different ways); Clark, supra note 13, at 1417, 1455 (citing studies that conclude for-profits have
lower costs than nonprofits); see generally Amanda J. Vaughn, The Use of the Nonprofit “Defense” under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 557, 562–67 (1999) (summarizing literature testing the differences between forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals).
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are growing in size and scale,82 and have the same propensities as for-profit hospitals to give free
care or not when their profit margins increase, the current 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status departs from
its original purpose to benefit the poor and impoverished.

B. Managed Care Organizations & The Government
Managed care organizations are the primary healthcare delivery and financing mechanism in
the United States.83 The two most prevalent types of managed care organizations are Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs). HMOs are
organizations that both underwrite insurance risk and arrange the provision of healthcare services
through a specified delivery system.84 PPOs are comprised of physicians and hospitals that contract
with employers and third-party payors to provide comprehensive healthcare services to subscribers
on a fee-for-service basis. 85 Even though HMOs do not promote a sufficiently large class of the
community to be “charitable” under 501(c)(3), HMOs can still obtain tax-exempt status as a social
welfare organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).86 Because HMOs can still obtain tax-exempt status,
consumers are subsidizing both the insurers and the healthcare providers within the third-party
payor healthcare model.
Federal legislators changed healthcare over the years, attempting to meet the healthcare needs
of their people while curbing the rising cost. Healthcare legislation can be grouped into three eras:
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See KAUFMANHALL, 2017 IN REVIEW: THE YEAR M&A SHOOK THE HEALTHCARE LANDSCAPE 1, 8 (2018),
https://www.kaufmanhall.com/sites/default/files/legacy_files/kh_report-ma-year-in-review_d4-rebrand.pdf (indicating
that the number of mergers of hospitals and healthcare systems have increased steadily from 50 to 115 a year
respectively from 2009–2017, and that not-for-profit systems were 75% of the transactions, acquiring not- for-profit
and for-profit entities in 2017); see also KAUFMANHALL, 2018 M&A IN REVIEW: A NEW HEALTHCARE LANDSCAPE
TAKES SHAPE 1, 2 (2019), https://www.kaufmanhall.com/sites/default/files/documents/2019-01/2018-merger-acquisition-year-inreview_kaufman-hall.pdf (indicating that the size of the transacting parties have been growing at a compounded annual
growth rate of 13.8 percent since 2008); see generally Greaney, supra note 32, at 217, 231 (“Hundreds of hospital
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hospital markets.”).
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2013).
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(1) Progressive Health Insurance Era; (2) Expansionary Health Insurance Era; and (3) Containment
Health Insurance Era.87 During the Progressive Health Insurance Era, from the 1890s–1920s,
insurance was most concerned with the negative features of capitalism and high-density
overcrowded cities, focusing primarily on employment and its side effects.88 The Expansionary
Health Insurance Era, from the 1930s–1960s, was driven by the need to improve healthcare
services. As medicine developed tools to treat illnesses and hospitals became the central means to
deliver healthcare services, healthcare costs began to increase.89 Thirdly, The Containment
Insurance Era began in the 1970s in response to rapid increases in healthcare spending driven by
recently enacted Medicare and Medicaid programs.90 As a result of healthcare cost and spending
increases, several pieces of ex post legislation were enacted, such as The Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970,91 The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,92 and The Health Planning and
Resource Development Act and its Certificate of Need requirements in 1974.93
According to scholars,94 five main factors contribute to rising healthcare costs: (1) technology
as a cost-driver;95 (2) a fragmented, uncoordinated system of insurers and healthcare providers;96
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Barry R. Furrow, Cost and Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J.
822, 827 (2013); see also Paul Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The Changing Objective of National Health Insurance,
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88
See Furrow, supra note 87, at 827.
89
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(3) the aging population;97 (4) unnecessary healthcare screenings;98 and (5) additional regulation
from the Affordable Care Act.99 Because the factors contributing to rising healthcare costs are so
numerous, federal legislators struggle to keep healthcare prices down through healthcare reform.

III.

Interactions in a Third-Party Payor System: Hospitals and
Managed Care Organizations

A. Healthcare Post Affordable Care Act & The Third-Party Payor System
Today, after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, hospitals face increasing pressures to
transform themselves into long-term care facilities.100 Not-for-profit hospitals utilize budget cuts
and mergers to achieve long-term success. Budget cuts require not-for-profit hospitals to sustain
operations with less capital. Mergers increase a not-for-profit hospitals’ economies of scale—
reducing their cost of production and increasing their bargaining power in their employment,
supply, and insurance contractual negotiations.
Hospitals use the out-patient care service model to cut the costs of patient care and increase the
quantity of healthcare services they provide. In the out-patient care service model, patients are first
diagnosed by a primary care physician and then referred to a specialist for treatment. From an
economic point of view, out-patient care is a successful form of cost reduction because it
incentivizes specialization among different healthcare practice groups. Instead of having a few
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general care facilities, our healthcare industry has small, specialized out-patient facilities.
Although this fractionalization reduces the cost of care, it increases the administrative cost of
patients. Patients no longer enjoy the “one-stop-shop,” and must go through different entities and
administrations to receive healthcare. Even though the out-patient business model lowers
consumer convenience satisfaction and increases administrative expenses, hospitals still choose
the out-patient business model for its profits—sometimes exceeding twenty-five percent of the
hospital’s income.101
Out-patient procedures have their advantages, reducing patient recovery time and the costs of
performance. However, they create fundamental problems. The out-patient fee-for-service
reimbursement model leaves patients subject to high, unregulated prices. Under the fee-for-service
arrangement, healthcare services are unbundled and paid for separately. This fractionalization of
service incentivizes physicians to provide more healthcare services because payment is dependent
on the quantity of care, rather than the quality of care. Thus, one problem that federal legislators
face is whether they should counteract the negative effects of the fee-for-service reimbursement
payment model with pay-for-performance financial programs.102
The third-party payor system eliminates price competition among providers.103 Healthcare
providers must contract with healthcare insurers to increase their customer base, while healthcare
insurers contract with employers or consumers to increase their insurance pools. Healthcare
insurers act as self-interested intermediaries between the true provider and the true consumer of
healthcare services—destroying traditional supply and demand market forces in a healthcare
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transaction. Therefore, the healthcare industry does not respond to traditional supply and demand
market forces.104 Even though the United States has a single-payer system for those over the age
of 65 and those below the poverty line, this paper only analyzes the third-party payor system,
which covered 67.5 percent of the United States’ population in 2016.105

B. Not-for-Profit Hospitals and their Competitive Edge Over For-Profit Hospitals
Not-for-profit corporations and for-profit corporations face the same incentives.106 Any
corporation must cover its cost in the long run in order to operate.107 A corporation may sustain
losses in the short term; however, it is unfeasible to incur losses in the long term. The charitable
purposes of not-for-profit corporations and the mission statements of for-profit corporations are
functionally the same. Both types of corporations offer goods or services in order to promote their
charitable purpose or mission statement.108 Because both types of corporations want to promote
their charitable purposes or their mission statements, they both face incentives to maximize profits.
Not-for-profit hospitals would rather reap tax-exempt subsidies than possess the right to raise
funds via equity.109 Not-for-profit hospitals retain direct subsidies from the federal government via
their tax-exempt status and could further qualify for state subsidies. These tax benefits are
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predictable and not subjected to future costs. On the other hand, raising funds via equity requires
the corporation to issue stock and pay dividends on future earnings. Because equity has a higher
cost of capital, in the long run, not-for-profit hospitals unfairly obtain cheaper sources of funding
to grow their operations.
Not-for-profit hospitals, in comparison to their for-profit counterpart, sustain bigger margins
to reinvest in themselves.110 Larger margins equate to more working capital to reinvest into “cutting
edge” technology, attracting the most qualified doctors.111 On that same token, not-for-profit
hospitals face incentives to reinvest their larger pools of working capital into the aesthetic looks of
their hospitals and patient amenities. In doing so, not-for-profit hospitals can increase consumer
satisfaction, which in turn could increase their charitable donations.112 Because tax-exempt
hospitals have larger pools of working capital to reinvest into the most “cutting edge” technology,
the aesthetic looks of their hospitals, and patient amenities, they have unfair competitive
advantages in the healthcare services they provide. Not only are their doctors more skilled, but
their facilities have greater aesthetic appeal and amenities—increasing consumer satisfaction.
Due to larger margins, not-for-profit hospitals pay their employees more than their for-profit
counterparts. Two studies compared employee pay between tax-exempt hospitals and for-profit
hospitals—finding an odd result. Specifically, the studies concluded that not-for-profit hospitals
paid their qualified nurses, on average, more than for-profit hospitals, and as a result, attracted
better nurses.113 These studies support the proposition that not-for-profit hospitals have an unfair
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competitive edge because they are able to allocate more funds to their employees’ wages. Because
not-for-profit hospitals pay their employees more for comparable work, hospital employees face
financial incentives to shift their place of employment from for-profit hospitals to not-for-profit
hospitals in the long run.
Unlike for-profit hospitals, religious not-for-profit hospitals can explicitly ask potential
employees what their religious affiliations are during the hiring process and can choose to hire or
not hire a potential employee on that basis.114 Armed with this information, religious not-for-profit
hospitals can discriminate against skilled employees that do not share the same religious beliefs as
the institution. Coupling this unique ability with the proposition that Christian employees, on
average, provide better customer service due to their religious beliefs, religious not-for-profit
organizations can systematically assemble and maintain better workforces than their for-profit
counterparts.
The proposition that Christian employees provide better customer service than non-religious
employees with similar skills is reasonable and supported by studies.115 For example, Catholic
social teaching encourages adherents to treat the sick with love, compassion, and respect for human
dignity.116 Because Catholic social teaching promotes healing the sick and studies suggest religious
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leadership teams are better at servicing patients than non-religious teams,117 religious not-for-profit
hospitals likely serve patients with better customer service. If this were true, Catholic not-for-profit
hospitals unfairly compete in the marketplace. Patients will respond to the benefits religious notfor-profit hospitals produce and use these facilities more in the long run. In essence, if an average
consumer’s healthcare coverage allows them to choose between identical services at either a forprofit hospital or a Christian not-for-profit hospital, the average consumer would likely choose the
Christian not-for-profit hospital.
Not-for-profit organizations face less regulation than for-profit organizations and thus, retain
more discretion in their business endeavors.118 In response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
where corrupt executives enticed corporate investment using fraudulent accounting methods, the
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) compelled for-profit corporations to implement
additional accounting requirements—increasing transparency and deterring corruption.119 Even
though debates extending the additional accounting requirements to not-for-profit organizations
took place, Sarbanes-Oxley was never extended to regulate them.120 Thus, not-for-profit entities
avoided additional government oversight of Sarbanes-Oxley regulations along with any costs
associated with it.
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For-profit boards and executives face more scrutiny in their business decisions than not-forprofit boards and executives. Shareholders hold for-profit boards and executives accountable,
whereas non-profit boards and executives are only accountable to themselves.121 For-profit boards
and executives must generate reports for their shareholders on a consistent basis, while not-forprofit boards and executives do not.122 The frequency of reporting restricts for-profit boards’ and
executives’ choices—in fear of potential shareholder litigation. Because not-for-profit boards and
executives face less scrutiny in their business decisions, they have more discretion in how they
derive their profit margins.
Due to a lack of accountability and beneficial group payoffs, not-for-profit boards are more
likely to engage in unethical conduct than their for-profit counterpart. According to studies, board
members are susceptible to “situational pressures” in group settings.123 These “situational
pressures” are especially likely in contexts where people lack accountability for collective decision
making.124 Not-for-profit board members face collective incentives to make their organization the
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most profitable because it makes themselves more marketable for other corporate positions.125
Because not-for-profit boards face collective incentives to maximize the organization’s profits and
are less accountable systematically, they are more vulnerable to moral blinders that cloud ethical
judgment.
The Accordable Care Act does more harm than good—pummeling tax-exempt hospitals with
additional regulations without much societal benefit. In 2010, the Affordable Care Act added four
general requirements, listed in I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012), to encourage not-for-profit hospital
charitable giving:
(1) establish written financial assistance and emergency policies,
(2) limit amounts charged for emergency or other medically necessary
care to individuals eligible for assistance policy,
(3) make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual is
eligible for assistance under the hospital’s financial assistance
policy before engaging in extraordinary collection actions against
the individual, and
(4) conduct a Community Health Needs Assessment (“CHNA”) and
adopt an implementation strategy at least once every three years
(effective after March 23, 2012).
Federal legislators intended to hold not-for-profit hospitals to a higher standard by
implementing the additional requirements, forcing not-for-profit hospitals to focus more on
community health needs.126 However, these requirements have nothing to do with charitable
giving. Instead, they aligned with the financial interest of not-for-profit hospitals to maximize
profits. The first three requirements deal with information disclosure policies, while the fourth
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requirement deals with CHNA and its implementation.127 Hospitals first created CHNAs to
determine the health needs of their local community so they could better cater their services to
them.128 Tax-exempt hospitals face profit-maximizing incentives to meet their community’s
specific health needs, providing enough supply to meet their community’s specific demands.
Because CHNAs align with the financial interest of hospitals and the other three requirements
listed in 501(r) focus on information disclosure, the additional requirements do not change the
behavioral incentives of tax-exempt hospitals.
Not-for-profit hospitals who fail to meet the Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements are
fined a $50,000 excise tax for any given taxable year and could lose their tax-exempt status.129
Despite the plain meaning of the internal revenue code, the IRS will not strip not-for-profit
hospitals of their tax-exempt statuses unless their noncompliance with the additional requirements
is “willful or egregious.”130As of September 2020, using the Westlaw database, neither the IRS
nor a court has clarified the IRS’s “willful or egregious” noncompliance standard. Thus, the IRS
will not attack tax-exempt hospitals’ statuses as long as they maintain good faith efforts to comply
with the Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements.
One study found hospitals responding to the Affordable Care Act’s additional requirements
and providing increased levels of charitable care; however, this study wrongly compares the
expenses on charitable care to the entities’ total expenses to determine whether hospitals are
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responding.131 The study should be comparing charity care in relation to the entities’ revenue
streams and profits. Entities that make more profits, in theory, should spend more on charitable
care. The entity could exercise its market power and raise prices, make more profit, and neither
change its charitable care expenditures nor operating expenses. The ratio would remain intact.
Likewise, if a hospital effectuated a merger or acquisition, reducing their operating expenses via
efficiency gains, and left charitable expenditures unaltered, then their charitable expenditures in
relation to their total expenses would increase even though their nominal charitable spending
remained stagnant. Thus, data using operating expenses as a comparable baseline is flawed.

C. Not-for-Profit Hospitals’ Cooperatives with Managed Care Organizations
Managed Care Organizations (“MCOs”) make healthcare worse. They disrupt traditional
supply and demand market forces, serving as third-party intermediaries between the true supplier
of healthcare services and its true consumer. Hospitals are the true suppliers of healthcare services,
while the recipients of healthcare treatment are the true consumers. MCOs contract with true
consumers, either directly or through their employer, for services rendered and then contract with
hospitals for services provided. Because hospitals, the true supplier, and recipients of healthcare
treatment, the true consumer, can only negotiate prices with MCOs and not with each other, MCOs
impede traditional supply and demand market forces.
Consumers do not have real choices in either the market for healthcare insurance or in the
market for healthcare services. Employers negotiate the price of their employee’s healthcare
insurance, while their healthcare insurer negotiates the prices of the employee’s treatment. In
addition, consumers with employer-sponsored health insurance face little incentive to shop for
unsponsored coverage because employers incorporate the price of healthcare coverage into their

131

Susannah C. Tahk, Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Their Communities, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 33, 61, 73, 85 (2014)
(concluding that hospitals are responding to the Affordable Care Act’s requirements and giving out more charitable
care, comparing expenses on charitable care in relation to total expenses).

124

employees’ wages. 132 Due to employers passing on the costs, employees would suffer an indirect
pay cut when they decline an employer-sponsored healthcare plan for another healthcare insurance
provider.133 Thus, employees would be worse off purchasing a private healthcare plan in lieu of an
employer-sponsored healthcare plan. Because employees are worse off denying employersponsored healthcare plans and have no ability to negotiate prices, in a third-party payor system,
consumers act as price-takers and take whatever coverage their employer provides.134
Although it could be argued that MCOs reduce the cost of providing healthcare by reducing
transaction costs, MCOs face no incentives to pass those efficiency gains to consumers. Instead,
MCOs disrupt the price setting mechanisms of healthcare, serving as a third-party intermediary
between the provider and ultimate purchaser of goods. Because there is a disconnect between
consumers and the prices paid to service providers, consumers cannot internalize the true cost of
their healthcare services. Thus, consumers are unable to compare prices of healthcare services and
rely on their employers, who have unaligned financial incentives, to negotiate deals on their
behalf.135
In a market where prices are not the “central nervous system,” the only way for hospitals to
gain patients is through HMOs or other insurance providers.136 As a result, hospitals face incentives
to join HMOs to increase their consumer base.137 This form of market allocation pressures hospitals
to contract the price of their services as high as possible to HMOs and other insurance providers,
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who will then reimburse the hospital for the services rendered to their patients, to maintain their
profits. Likewise, HMOs face incentives to contract the price of the hospital services as low as
possible to maintain their profits. In the end, the hospital or the HMO with more relative market
power will extract the most profit from the transaction.
Legal scholars explored the difficulties of altruistic giving and determined that altruistic
markets cannot operate where intermediaries capture available economic surplus.138 A third-party
payor system creates too many intermediaries in a healthcare transaction. All of the intermediaries
face incentives to make profits and grow their operations. As a result, any tax benefits we grant
these institutions are unlikely to trickle down to its intended beneficiary—taxpayers. Given this
literature, as applied to the healthcare industry, the question then becomes: can we trust charitable
healthcare entities to engage in altruistic behavior when they face incentives to reap the economic
surplus themselves?

D. Market Power of Not-for-Profit Hospitals & Managed Care Organizations
Market power is an instrumental negotiation tool for healthcare entities and is a key part of this
Article’s assessment of not-for-profit healthcare organizations. Market power refers to the ability
of a firm, or a group of firms acting jointly, to raise prices above competitive levels without losing
so many sales that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded.139 In a third-party payor
system, market power is the primary factor determining the prices healthcare firms charge
consumers for services and upstream suppliers for goods.140 Today, healthcare firms use it as a
bargaining chip to sell their goods or services at higher prices, or alternatively, negotiate lower
138
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prices for purchased goods.
Not-for-profit hospitals and MCOs face the same incentives to maximize profits.141
Not-for-profit hospitals face incentives to negotiate higher prices with MCOs for medical services
and negotiate lower prices with upstream suppliers for medical equipment and consumables.142
MCOs, on the other hand, face incentives to negotiate low prices with hospitals for medical
services provided and negotiate high prices with employers and individuals for their insurance
coverage.143 In essence, the relative market power between hospitals and MCOs will determine
how these firms split profits. The firm with more market power will extract as much economic
surplus as possible before agreeing to contractual terms. Because price negotiations between notfor-profit hospitals and MCOs occur behind closed doors, without consumer participation,
consumers are unable to extract some of the economic surplus and reduce their total
cost for healthcare.

Conclusion
The 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status departs from its original purpose to benefit local communities
and relieve the government from allocating funds to combat economic and social ills. Under the
IRS’s interpretation of “charitable,” tax-exempt hospitals need not give free care to the poor or
provide emergency care services despite large government tax expenditures. Instead, tax- exempt
hospitals are growing in scale, market concentration, and profit—charging taxpayers higher
prices—without increasing charitable distribution. Accordingly, this result explains why the
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government’s tax expenditures are increasing while charitable giving is waning. In addition, the
government suffers direct harm as a market participant—paying higher prices to not-for-profit
hospitals through Medicaid and Medicare programs.
The Affordable Care Act exacerbates the injustice and should be repealed. It does not solve
the fundamental problems with not-for-profit hospitals in a third-party payor system. Instead, it
increases administrative costs—compounding inefficiencies on inefficiencies. The Affordable Care
Act’s first three additional requirements do not relate to charitable giving, focusing on information
disclosure instead. The fourth requirement aligns with not-for-profit hospitals’ financial interest to
maximize profits instead of promoting charitable giving as intended. This legislation forced 20
million consumers into the healthcare market, leaving not-for-profit healthcare entities salivating at
the market growth. Consumers already subsidize the inefficient healthcare system; why should they
be forced to buy healthcare insurance and further increase the profits of tax-exempt hospitals and
managed care organizations? All they get in return are increased prices.
The 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status should be reformed, requiring tax-exempt organizations to
distribute their profits. This solution is politically palatable by both adherents of wealth
redistribution and free market principles. It also has the potential to stimulate community values
in an economy where wealth inequality is growing. A distribution requirement would not stop
these organizations from charging higher prices, but it would require them to distribute more
profits in proportion to their revenue growth. In theory, their “charitable” distributions should
equal the tax breaks not-for-profit hospitals are receiving at the federal and state level. If this theory
held true in practice, then tax-exempt organizations would not have pecuniary advantages over
their for-profit counterparts. Furthermore, although tax-exempt institutions would still have more
discretion in their business endeavors, facing less regulation and a lack of shareholder
accountability, more discretion only poses a relatively higher risk of unethical collective behavior.
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